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SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?:
WHY BOLIVIAN TACTICS AND U.S.
“FLEXIBILITY” UNDERMINE THE
SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC
DRUGS
INTRODUCTION
ust short of twelve thousand feet above sea level,1 La Paz,
Bolivia has one of the highest elevations of any major city
in the world.2 In July of 2015,3 Pope Francis, the highly influen-
tial leader of the Catholic Church, traveled to a variety of cities
in South America.4 One of those cities, La Paz,5 encouraged his
public request to chew coca leaves during his stay in Bolivia,6 as
it is “widely used in Bolivia and other Andean countries as a
remedy for altitude sickness.”7 Coca leaves have been grown and
produced for a variety of purposes in Bolivia, ranging from me-
dicinal to ritualistic.8 During his tour across South America,
Pope Francis initiated his visit to La Paz by drinking a special
type of tea known as “trimate,” a chamomile tea that contains
anise and coca, which is said to help one adjust to the high alti-
tude of this particular city.9 Although coca serves a form of med-
ical purpose, such as remedying altitude sickness, the Pope’s
spokesman noted that the pope was interested in sampling coca
1. Conor Gaffey, Pope to Chew Coca Leaves in Bolivia, Reveals Minister,
NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2015), http://europe.newsweek.com/pope-chew-coca-
leaves-bolivia-reveals-minister-329482.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Joanna Plucinska, Pope Francis Samples Coca Leaves, the Main In-
gredient in Cocaine, on Bolivia Trip, TIME (July 8, 2015),
http://time.com/3950582/pope-francis-coca-bolivia-altitude-cocaine/ (showing
that the Pope sought to consume the coca leaf as a means of showing respect
for “local Bolivian customs”).
6. Gaffey, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. See Tom Blickman, Coca Leaf: Myths and Reality – A Beginner’s Guide
to Coca, TRANSNAT’L INST. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.tni.org/en/primer/coca-
leaf-myths-and-reality.
9. See Plucinska, supra note 5.
J
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leaves to chew on his visit as a means to show respect for local
Bolivian custom.10
Notwithstanding the cultural significance to the indigenous
peoples of Bolivia, coca is also known to be a main ingredient in
the production of cocaine,11 an addictive and prohibited sub-
stance under the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 196112 (“Convention”), an international treaty designed
to limit the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, ex-
port, manufacture, and production of drugs exclusively to medi-
cal and scientific purposes.13 In addition to the coca leaf, the Con-
vention covers a multitude of other narcotics, ranging from
opium to cannabis, with the overarching goal of achieving inter-
national cooperation with respect to governing the proper or im-
proper fluxes of narcotics.
The Convention, which is “concerned with the health and wel-
fare of mankind,”14 provides limited breathing room for those
members who question the prohibition of particular substances
under its terms. Bolivia, in a rare move, withdrew from the Con-
vention, later reacceding with the stipulation that the coca leaf
is an exception to the Convention.15 As of January 11, 2013, Bo-
livia was permitted to return as a member to the Convention
with a reservation that allowed “traditional coca leaf chewing;
the consumption and use of the coca leaf in its natural state for
cultural and medicinal purposes, such as its use in infusions;
and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca leaf to
the extent necessary for these licit purposes.”16
The paradoxical irony does not lie behind the Bolivian stipula-
tion but rather behind the fact that the United States has not
10. Id.
11. Gaffey, supra note 1.
12. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by the 1972
Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Aug. 8,
1975, 976 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Convention on Narcotic Drugs].
13. See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, 1961, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-
convention.html?ref=menuside (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
14. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, pmbl.
15. See U.N. Secretary-General, Depositary Notification, Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of): Accession, U.N. Doc. C.N.94.2013.TREATIES-VI.18 (Jan. 11,
2013).
16. Id.
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attempted the same maneuver with respect to policies envelop-
ing the recreational use of marijuana.17 A greater irony is that
the United States remains one of the largest critics of the Boliv-
ian tactic of withdrawal and reaccession.18 As recently as Sep-
tember of 2015, the United States “again ‘decertified’ Bolivia
over what it calls a failure to comply with international narcotics
agreements.”19 Decertification enables the United States to
“withdraw aid packages, and impose certain additional
measures on a government that is deemed not to be cooperating
with American directives.”20 The decertification of Bolivia has
been widely construed as hypocritical, however, “given that the
U.S. may be in contravention”21 of the Convention, as a handful
of its states have now legalized the recreational use of mariju-
ana.
Although marijuana is now legal in several states,22 the Con-
vention does not necessarily warrant protection for its recrea-
tional use.23 The Convention allows “[s]tates parties to use can-
nabis for medical purposes”24; however, recreational use does not
“meet the requirements of the international drug control trea-
ties.”25
This noncompliance raises questions about the effectiveness of
such treaties. This Note discusses the archaic and constricting
nature of the Convention. As morals, political landscapes, and
science change over time, it is sometimes necessary to permit, or
at the very least reflect upon, such changes rather than stifle
them. This Note will analyze the future of the Convention, as its
17. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar.
25, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 3, 99 (demonstrating that the United States has not
attached any reservations since the Convention was amended in 1972).
18. Samuel Oakford, The White House Blacklisted Bolivia for Growing Coca
While US States Sell Legal Weed, VICE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://news.vice.com/article/the-white-house-blacklisted-bolivia-for-growing-
coca-while-us-states-sell-legal-weed.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Where Pot is Legal, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/interac-
tive/news/economy/marijuana-legalization-map/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
23. See INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2014, at 25 (2014), https://www.incb.org/docu-
ments/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2014/English/AR_2014.pdf.
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id. at 25.
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effectiveness is increasingly being undermined by its members’
inability to abide by its provisions.
Part I of this Note will examine the history of the Convention,
specifically the rationale for its creation as well as the goals it
intends to achieve. This Part will also include a discussion re-
garding the governing bodies of the Convention, particularly the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which seek to en-
force compliance amongst signatories to the treaty. Additionally,
this Part will discuss procedural mechanisms whereby parties
can propose amendments or reservations to the Convention.
Part II will provide an in-depth analysis of how Member States
have come to skirt their responsibilities owed to the Convention.
This Part will discuss the state of Bolivia and its fight to pre-
serve coca leaf chewing, which has sociocultural importance in
the country. This Part will discuss how Bolivia’s withdrawal and
subsequent reaccession to the Convention with reservations
poses a threat to the manner by which the global community
views these treaties, namely the seriousness with which Mem-
ber States consider such treaties. In addition, this Part will also
address U.S. interactions with the Convention, particularly with
respect to the domestic legalization of marijuana at the state
level, in light of the continued federal prohibition against its rec-
reational use in the United States. Lastly, this Part will discuss
how the United States views the provisions of the Convention
and how its current position of “flexibility” contravenes the Con-
vention itself. Part III will analyze why the Bolivian and U.S.
examples of circumvention, in light of current Convention proce-
dures, both pose problems for the international narcotics com-
munity and to the Convention itself by demonstrating the ina-
bility of the Convention and the INCB to punish wayward sig-
natories. This Part will highlight why current Convention prac-
tice does not permit meaningful change for those who seek it. In
addition, this Part will analyze why the INCB, which is the po-
licing body of the Convention, has only exacerbated hindrances
facing the Convention. Lastly, Part IV will highlight several pos-
sible solutions to the problems, namely the problem of contra-
vention without reprimand. These possible solutions include the
adoption of a blanket amendment to the Convention, which
might prevent a signatory from withdrawing and reacceding
with reservations to the Convention, and empowerment of the
INCB with the proper tools to reprimand signatories who violate
the Convention.
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I. THE SINGLE CONVENTION ONNARCOTICDRUGS, 1961
The adoption of the Convention is historically “regarded as a
milestone in the history of international drug control.”26 The
Convention sought to codify preexisting multilateral treaties in-
volving the control of narcotics and “extended the existing con-
trol systems to include the cultivation of plants that were grown
as the raw material of narcotic drugs.”27
The principal objectives of the Convention are to limit the flow
of narcotics only to the medical and scientific community and to
also “deter and discourage drug traffickers.”28 In addition to such
objectives, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, a U.N. agency
seeking to help governments to address drug and crime-related
issues, has stated that the Convention seeks to combat the abuse
of such narcotics by “coordinated international action.”29
This Part will provide a brief, but thorough, background on the
Convention. Section A will describe a short history of the Con-
vention’s creation, including its overarching goals and aspira-
tions as an international document. Section B will describe the
governing bodies within the Convention, particularly highlight-
ing the importance of the INCB. Lastly, section C will describe
amendment and reservation procedure under the Convention
and what is required when signatories wish to change or adopt
a stance with respect to the Convention.
A. Background on the Convention
Prior to the establishment of the Convention, there had been
a number of multilateral treaties dealing with drug control on
an international level.30 This old regime of treaties, however,
was superseded by the Convention when member countries saw
the “need to start fresh” by enacting one binding document.31
Seventy-three states were represented by chosen representa-
26. UNODC, supra note 13.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. N.Y.C. BAR: COMM. ON DRUGS & THE LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL TREATIES: HOW IMPORTANT ARE THEY FOR US DRUG REFORM? (2012),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/3_20072283-Internatio-
nalDrugControlTreaties.pdf.
31. Id.
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tives at the U.N. Conference for the Adoption of a Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs (“Conference”),32 whose goal was to
“replace by a single instrument the existing multilateral treaties
in the field, to reduce the number of international treaty organs
exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs and to
make provision for the control of the production of raw materials
of narcotic drugs.”33At the Conference, which was held from Jan-
uary 24 to March 25 of 1961,34 representatives crafted a docu-
ment that sought to balance the pragmatic goals of international
drug compliance with a series of more lofty goals aimed at bet-
tering mankind.
The preamble to the Convention states that one of the primary
reasons for its creation is to recognize that addiction to narcotics
constitutes a “serious evil,”35 both to the individual and the so-
cial and economic well-being of mankind.36 Although the pream-
ble is ambitious in its attempts to achieve both practicality and
optimism, the Convention unyieldingly recognizes the necessity
of narcotics with respect to medical use, noting that it is “indis-
pensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate
provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic
drugs for such purposes.”37 In order to achieve international co-
operation, the Convention is “guided by the same principles and
aimed at common objectives.”38 Yet, domestic agendas often
clash with the “principles”39 and “common objectives”40 of the in-
ternational community, making these goals less attainable. For
example, countries like Bolivia have historically maintained the
cultural importance of the coca leaf, and countries like the
United States have recently revised their views on the recrea-
tional use of marijuana. Thus, both domestic agendas appear to
32. See Final Act (with Annexed Resolutions) of the United Nations Confer-
ence for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961,
520 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter Final Act]. For the list of Member States and the
dates they became party to the treaty, with or without stipulations, see id.;
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12.
33. Final Act, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, pmbl.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
2016] Should I Stay or Should I Go? 531
conflict with the views of the international community with re-
spect to limiting the nonmedical use of narcotics.
Distinct from a self-executing treaty (e.g., a treaty that be-
comes “judicially enforceable upon ratification”41), the Conven-
tion is judicially enforceable upon legislative implementation by
the parties.42 Under Article 4 of the Convention, parties are ob-
ligated to take legislative and administrative measures that are
necessary to give effect to and carry out the provisions of this
Convention within their own territories, to cooperate with other
states in the execution of the provisions of this Convention, and
(subject to the provisions of this Convention) to limit the produc-
tion, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use
and possession of drugs to medical and scientific purposes.43 Ar-
ticle 4 thus requires that Member States take their own
measures in complying with the text of the treaty itself. Article
4, as a means of self-relying compliance, tends not to be ineffec-
tive, as Member States still seem to ignore the boundaries of the
Convention. This tension is only furthered by domestic agendas
that conflict with the Convention, as only signatories have the
power to implement legislation as a corrective measure. Thus,
the Convention relies upon several governing bodies to ensure
compliance with its provisions.
B. Governing Bodies of the Convention
Article 5 of the Convention delegates international supervision
of narcotics to two major governing bodies, otherwise known as
“International Control Organs”44: the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs of the Economic and Social Council (“Economic and Social
Council”), and the INCB.45 The functions of the INCB are laid
down in several different treaties: the Convention; the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the United Nations
41. Self-Executing Treaty Definition, CORNELL U. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_executing_treaty (last visited Mar. 24,
2017).
42. See id. (“A treaty could be identified as either self-executing or non-self
executing by looking to various indicators, including statements that are made
by Congress or the Executive regarding the treaty, indeterminate language of
the treaty, or if the treaty deals with a matter within the exclusive law-making
power of Congress, indicating that Congress must create implementing legis-
lation.”).
43. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 4.
44. Id. art. 5.
45. Id.
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Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances of 1988.46 While the Economic and Social
Council acts as the “central policy-making body within the UN
system for dealing with drug related matters,”47 the INCB en-
sures that the provisions of the international drug treaties are
carried out by member governments48 and will be the focus of
this Note. The INCB is comprised of thirteen members, each of
whom are elected by the Economic and Social Council for a time
period of five years (with the possibility of reelection).49 Of these
thirteen members, ten are elected from a list of individuals nom-
inated by state party governments.50 The remaining three indi-
viduals are chosen from a list of persons designated by theWorld
Health Organization “for their medical, pharmacological or
pharmaceutical experience.”51 Members of the INCB are ex-
pected to serve objectively, regardless of the state from which
they hail.52
As the INCB is primarily tasked with “monitoring national
drug policies and assessing their relationship with the trea-
ties,”53 scholars have been keen to note that the INCB has no
“police power to enforce the Conventions’ provisions.”54 Because
the INCB has been designated as the “quasi-judicial monitoring
body”55 for the proper implementation of the Convention, it is
obligated to monitor individual state compliance with the arti-
cles set forth by the Convention itself but is not necessarily em-
powered to have the requisite impact on violating states as one
might expect.56 The INCB is called upon to require explanations
46. Mandate and Functions, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD,
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html (last visited Jan.
1, 2016).
47. DAVE BEWLEY-TAYLOR & MIKE TRACE, BECKLEY FOUND. DRUG POLICY
PROGRAMME, REPORT 7: THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD:
WATCHDOG OR GUARDIAN OF THE UN DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS 3 (Feb.
2006), http://idpc.net/publications/2006/01/international-narcotics-control-
board-watchdog-or-guardian-of-un-drug-control-conventions.
48. Id.
49. The International Narcotics Control Board, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL
BOARD, https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 3.
54. Id.
55. Mandate and Functions, supra note 46.
56. Id.
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if Member States have violated particular articles of the Con-
vention.57 When, and if, a Member State is not compliant with
the Convention, the INCB is required to “propose appropriate
remedial measures”58 to those Member States.59 If said Member
States are unable to meet these requirements or implement such
remedial measures, the INCB is asked to “assist Governments
in overcoming such difficulties,”60 specifically by opening up con-
sultations whereby the INCB will make recommendations as to
how the Member State can better comply.
C. Amendment and Reservation Procedure Under the Single
Convention
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Convention, any party to the
treaty may propose an amendment.61 The text of the proposed
amendment and its reasons for submission must be communi-
cated to the U.N. Secretary-General.62 A letter containing the
reasons for which the moving party is seeking to amend the Con-
vention may also accompany this amendment.63 From there, the
U.N. Secretary-General communicates the proposed amend-
ment and its accompanying explanations to both the parties to
the Convention and the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations (“Council”).64 The Council will then decide to ei-
ther call a conference in accordance with Article 62, paragraph
4 of the Charter of the United Nations65 or ask all parties to the
Convention whether they accept the amendment.66
If the amendment is circulated amongst the parties to the Con-
vention and has not been explicitly rejected by any of the parties
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 47.
62. Id.
63. For an example, see Bolivia’s proposal of amendments to the Convention
on Narcotic Drugs. See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Proposal of Amendments
by Bolivia to Article 49, Paragraphs 1(c) and 2(e), Note Verbale dated Mar. 12,
2009 from the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the U.N. Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. E/2009/78 (May 15, 2009) [hereinafter Bolivian Amendment Pro-
posal].
64. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, arts. 47, 1 (defining
“Council” as the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations).
65. Id. art. 47.
66. Id.
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within eighteen months, it “shall thereupon enter into force.”67
If any party to the Convention does decide, however, to reject the
proposed amendment, the Council may call a conference to con-
sider the amendment.68 Member States may also decide to in-
clude reservations. Reservations differ from amendments in the
context of the Convention in that, at the time of signature, rati-
fication, or accession to the Convention, a party may reserve the
right to temporarily permit (known as a transitional reserva-
tion) a narcotic that would otherwise be prohibited under the
treaty.69 Transitional reservations, however, are subject to fur-
ther restrictions both in substance and in time. In other words,
depending on the narcotic, transitional reservations permit law-
ful use of an otherwise unlawful narcotic under the Convention
for a limited period of time. In the case of Bolivia, this transi-
tional reservation would permit the practice of coca chewing for
twenty-five years after becoming a party to the Convention.
1. Article 14 of the Convention: Delegated Powers to the INCB
Article 14 of the Convention sets forth “measures that the
Board [INCB] may take to ensure the execution of the provi-
sions” of the Convention.70 When the INCB determines or has
reason to believe that goals of the treaty are in danger by the
behavior of a particular Member State, Article 14 enables the
INCB to set forth “increasingly severe” steps that the state in
question must follow to address the problem at hand.71
Article 14 states that if the INCB has “objective reasons to be-
lieve that the aims of the Convention are being seriously endan-
gered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory
to carry out the provisions of this Convention,”72 the INCB re-
serves the right to propose “consultations”73 or to request that
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. art. 49 (defining “transitional reservations” as the ability of a
party at the “time of signature, ratification or accession [to] reserve the right
to permit temporarily [drugs otherwise prohibited by the Convention] in any
one of its territories. . . .”).
70. Treaty Compliance, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD,
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/treaty-compliance/index.html (last visited Jan. 1,
2016).
71. Id.
72. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 14.
73. Id.
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the state in question furnish “explanations.”74 This allows the
INCB to inquire as to why the state committed the violation. If
the INCB concludes, however, that the Member State in ques-
tion has not adopted the necessary measures or has provided an
insufficient explanation in light of the violation, it may inform
the parties to the Convention as well as the Economic and Social
Council—who, in turn, brings the matter to the attention of the
U.N. General Assembly.75
Though it appears that the INCB does not wield significant
power under Article 14 because it can only ask questions, it nev-
ertheless retains the right to “recommend to parties that they
stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to
the country or territory concerned.”76 Said another way, the
INCB reserves the right to make a recommendation to the
United Nations and parties therein with respect to drug import
and export capabilities of a state party who is found to be violat-
ing the Convention. Although this might seem like a powerful
tool, individuals in the community have gone so far as to suggest
that it is unlikely that such a measure would be taken in a “hu-
manitarian” context.77 In other words, although the INCB has
the power to make the recommendation to other Member States
that they cease import and export relationships with the violat-
ing state, the recommendation is unlikely to go heeded. Overall,
the powers granted to the INCB under Article 14 relate only to
encouraging treaty compliance and do not allow it to punish
those who violate the treaty, therefore limiting the effectiveness
of the INCB.
II. SKIRTING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONVENTION
Bolivian and U.S. circumvention of responsibilities owed to the
Convention has played a significant role in highlighting proce-
dural and political loopholes by which these particular signato-
ries have evaded their duties. The Bolivian government has at-
tributed its tactics to a longstanding historical and cultural con-
nection to the coca leaf, whereas the United States has decidedly
74. Id.
75. See BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47.
76. Id.; see also Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 14.
77. N.Y.C. BAR: COMM. ON DRUGS & THE LAW, supra note 30, at 3 (stating
that a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and member of the INCB noted
that this is not a very “strong provision”).
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settled into a method of “flexibility” in interpreting the Conven-
tion.
In this Part, section A will draw attention to the Bolivian
method of withdrawal and reaccession, specifically with a reser-
vation exempting the coca leaf from the Convention. Further-
more, section B will discuss the United States in its flexible in-
terpretation of the Convention as a means of denying that a vio-
lation has occurred with respect to the domestic legalization of
marijuana in a number of individual states.
A. Bolivian Example—Withdrawal and Reaccession with Reser-
vations
The coca leaf, known primarily for being one of the major com-
ponents to the production of cocaine, has been grown in Bolivia
and the Andean region of South America for centuries.78 In Bo-
livia itself, it is estimated that nearly one-third of the population
consumes the coca leaf in its natural form as though it were cof-
fee or tea.79 Coca has been cultivated in Bolivia for centuries,
mainly by small farmers in the Chapare and Yungas regions of
the country.80 But the coca leaf was not always a crop associated
with economic or narcotic liberalization within the country of Bo-
livia. Instead, the coca leaf in Bolivia represents a significant
cultural and social component to its traditional and ancient her-
itage.81 For example, the coca leaf in Bolivia is a staple in prac-
ticing medicine as well as a component in various religious cer-
emonies.82 Bolivia sought to propose an amendment to the Con-
vention, exempting the coca leaf from its purview for these cul-
turally significant reasons.83 The Bolivian amendment, however,
failed to muster the votes needed to pass,84 but its subsequent
procedural maneuver of withdrawing from the Convention and
78. Ruxandra Guidi, Coca Is Known as the Main Ingredient in Cocaine. But
for Bolivia, It’s More Than That, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-23/coca-known-main-ingredient-cocaine-
bolivia-its-more.
79. Id.
80. BOLIVIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Rex A. Hudson & Dennis M. Hanratty eds.,
1989).
81. See infra Part II.A.1.
82. See id.
83. See infra Part II.A.2.
84. See id.
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then reacceding with an exemption for the coca leaf circum-
vented the obstacles Bolivia was facing with respect to coca leaf
usage.
1. Importance of the Coca Leaf in Bolivian Society
The sacred coca leaf, known as “hoja divina”85 to natives in the
region, has been used within the Andean society since approxi-
mately 3,000 BCE.86 Used in religious ceremonies and as tradi-
tional medicine among the upper-class of the Incan empire, the
coca leaf and the legends surrounding its cultivation trace back
to stories of the plant being used as a means of sustenance and
survival.87 Spanish domination of the Bolivian peoples, however,
led to the suppression of the coca leaf due to its association with
indigenous belief structure.88 The Spaniards, in their attempt to
promote Catholicism, believed that the coca leaf was an “instru-
ment of the devil.”89
Nevertheless, the Spaniards realized that the coca leaf had ad-
vantages. In forcing the natives to work in mines, Spaniards be-
came aware that coca leaf chewing helped to alleviate perpetual
hunger and fatigue of the workers.90 Inevitably, the Spaniards
understood that this crop could be cultivated and sold back to
the workers at inflated prices—enslaving workers to a plant as-
sociated with their cultural heritage.91
To the Bolivian farmer, and those who perpetuate the cultiva-
tion of the coca leaf, this plant has historical and cultural signif-
icance because it has been harvested within the region for thou-
sands of years. This sacred plant, however, is now subject to se-
vere scrutiny in the United States’ War on Drugs and is within
the scope of prohibited substance under the Convention.92 The
distinction between using the coca leaf for traditional and me-
dicinal purposes and using it to produce cocaine is a staunch one
and worthy of recognition.
85. See Bolivia: Legacy of Coca, ANDEAN INFO. NETWORK (June 9, 2004),
http://ain-bolivia.org/2004/06/bolivia-legacy-of-coca/.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
538 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
The method by which natives consume the coca leaf, known in
the region as “acullico,”93 is the same now as it was in the time
of the Incans.94 The individual removes the leaves individually
and places them in his or her mouth, chewing them until they
develop into a ball, which is then held between the cheek and
gums.95 The individual then takes an alkaline mixture, which
varies depending upon the region, and introduces it into the ball
of leaves, which “facilitates the release of the desired active prin-
ciples.”96 As the ball of leaves are left in the mouth over time, the
resulting substance is consumed by the individual, with the ball
of leaves remaining until the process is complete.97
This process has been found to alleviate the various ills and
discomforts of those who consume it.98 The coca leaf has been
particularly praised for its beneficial effects on respiration,
which is an “important consideration” for Bolivians, who inhabit
some of the highest-elevated regions in the world.99 Other meth-
ods of consuming the leaf (i.e., coca tea) exist for the purposes of
relieving nausea, dizziness, headaches, or mountain sickness as-
sociated with the content of the air and atmospheric pressure.100
Besides the health benefits associated with the leaf101 chewing
coca also has immense traditional and religious uses. In Bolivia,
certain natives chew the coca leaf during various ceremonies, in-
cluding marriages and wakes.102 In addition, when a new indi-
vidual is introduced to head a district of Bolivia, he is obligated
to take a drink and a pinch of coca with each head of house-
hold.103 Bolivian divination, black magic, and shamanistic heal-
ers are also known to practice through the medium of coca.104 It
93. Id.
94. See Richard T. Martin, The Role of Coca in the History, Religion, and
Medicine of South American Indians, 24 ECON. BOTANY 422 (1970).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 432.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The leaf is also considered to be an effective means of preventing dental
issues and alleviating the pains associated with rheumatism, headaches, and
external sores, particularly to reduce the swelling of wounds and eye irritation,
and can also be used as an aphrodisiac. See id. at 432–33.
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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is easy to understand then, given the practical and cultural sig-
nificance of the coca leaf, why the Bolivian peoples remain at-
tached to the practice, notwithstanding the Convention’s prohi-
bition.
2. Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment
In March of 2009, two years after the INCB published its an-
nual report (which called for the abolition and prohibition of coca
leaf usage), Bolivian President Evo Morales sent a letter to the
U.N. Secretary-General under Article 47 of the Convention.105
Morales made a passionate argument for why Bolivia should be
exempted from the prohibition due to its traditional practice of
chewing coca leaves and accompanied the letter with what was
a then-proposed amendment.106
Morales argued that coca leaf chewing is “a one-thousand-
year-old ancestral practice of the Andean indigenous peoples
that cannot and should not be prohibited.”107 In citing the histor-
ical practice of chewing coca leaves,108 Morales zealously argued
that the use of coca leaves is both a “sociocultural”109 and ritual-
istic practice of the indigenous population of the Andes, and that
coca leaves are closely linked to Bolivian “history and cultural
identity.”110 Morales then argued that “[t]he objective of the Sin-
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 is to control drug
abuse, not to prohibit ‘habits’ or sociocultural practices that do
not harm human health.”111 Though one could argue that drug
addiction is in itself a habit, Morales argued that this prohibition
was actually conflicting with the U.N. Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, which states that “indigenous peoples
have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, tech-
nologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources,
105. Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See also Evo Morales Ayma, Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2009, at A21 (noting the controversy surrounding the prohibition on
chewing coca leaves, a tradition with “cultural significance that transcends in-
digenous cultures and encompasses the mestizo population”).
109. Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora.
. . .”112
OnMarch 12, 2009, President Morales communicated Bolivia’s
proposed amendment and accommodating letter to the U.N. Sec-
retary-General113 formally requesting the deletion of paragraphs
1(c) and 2(e) of Article 49 of the Convention.114 Paragraph 1 of
Article 49 sets forth the narcotics that parties may temporarily
permit under the reservation procedure,115 with subsection (c) to
paragraph 1 dealing with coca leaf chewing in particular.116 Par-
agraph 2 of Article 49, however, generally places restrictions
upon reservations that parties make when becoming a party to
the Convention. Specifically, subsection (e) of paragraph 2 states
that “[c]oca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five
years from the coming into force of this Convention.”117
Bolivia disagreed with paragraph 2(e), which would have re-
quired the country to cease coca leaf chewing by December of
1989.118 For sociocultural reasons. Bolivia proposed an amend-
ment requesting that the prohibition of the coca leaf be deleted
from the text of the Convention.119 The amendment suggested
that because the “sociocultural practice of coca leaf chewing can-
not be permitted temporarily as if it were doomed to disappear
some day and as if it were an evil that should be permitted only
for a transitional period,”120 the United Nations should remove
Article 49, paragraph 1(c) and 2(e). In support of its proposed
amendment, Morales argued that the restrictions and prohibi-
tion of coca leaf chewing amounted to a violation of the rights of
indigenous peoples.121 Specifically, Morales highlighted the right
112. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Sept. 13, 2007).
113. See Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 49(1).
116. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 49(1)(c).
117. Id. art. 49(2)(e).
118. Abraham Kim, The Plight of Bolivian Coca Leaves: Bolivia’s Quest for
Decriminalization in the Face of Inconsistent International Legislation, 13
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 559, 565 (2014).
119. See Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
120. Id.
121. See id. In his letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Morales cited to Ar-
ticle 31 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which states:
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of indigenous peoples to maintain and protect their heritage, in-
cluding human resources, such as the coca plant and the cultural
expressions that stem therefrom.122 In short, President Morales
objected to the prohibition because the country viewed the use of
coca leaves as a traditional ancestral right. Despite his passion-
ate argument, the proposal was rejected by seventeen Member
States on the grounds that this change could affect the integrity
of the Convention and open the door for other Member States to
follow in Bolivia’s footsteps.123 Most significantly, many Member
States “indicated that they had no objections to the coca leaf
chewing, per se, which they recognized as an age-old practice of
indigenous peoples; however, they could not agree to the Boliv-
ian amendment on the grounds that it would jeopardize the in-
tegrity of the Convention.”124
3. Bolivia’s Withdrawal and Subsequent Reaccession with
Reservations
The rejected amendment led to Bolivia’s subsequent with-
drawal from the Convention on June 29, 2011.125 Withdrawal re-
fers to “a unilateral act by which a nation that is currently a
[I]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, pro-
tect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions as well as the
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures,
including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions
. . . and visual and performing arts. They also have the right
to maintain, control, protect, and develop their intellectual
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge,
and traditional cultural expressions.
Id.; see also G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 112, art. 31.
122. Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
123. See Press Conference on Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment to 1961 Narcot-
ics Drug Convention, UNITED NATIONS (June 24, 2011),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/110624_Bolivia.doc.htm.
124. Id.
125. International Narcotics Control Board Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, UNITEDNATIONSOFFICE ONDRUGS&
CRIME (July 6, 2011) https://www.unodc.org/lpo-bra-
zil/en/frontpage/2011/07/06-junta-internacional-de-control-de-narcoticos-la-
menta-la-denuncia-de-bolivia-de-la-convencion-unica-de-estupefa-
cientes.html.
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party to a treaty ends its membership in that treaty.”126 With-
drawal of one Member State, however, will not affect the others
still party to the Convention, as they remain bound to the provi-
sions of the Convention itself.127
On December 29, 2011, only several months after Bolivia’s
withdrawal from the treaty, President Morales, pursuant to Ar-
ticle 50, paragraph 3, which allows states to reaccede to the
treaty, unless said reservation has been objected to by one-third
of the Member States,128 proposed Bolivian reaccession to the
Convention with a reservation stating that it would not be bound
by the prohibition of coca leaf chewing.129 In this reservation,
Bolivia argued for the right to permit traditional coca leaf chew-
ing and “the consumption and use of the coca leaf in its natural
state for cultural and medicinal purposes; its use in infusions;
and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca leaf to
the extent necessary for these licit purposes.”130 In order for
this proposed reservation not to pass, it would have required
one-third of the 183 Member States (61 Member States) to object
within one year of the U.N. Secretary-General circulating this
reservation amongst the signatories.131 As that time expired,
only fifteen Member States, including the United States, ob-
jected to the reservation, thereby permitting the reaccession.132
The United States and the INCB disagreed with the Bolivian
tactic of withdrawal and subsequent reaccession with a reserva-
tion to the treaty. The United States formally objected133 to the
126. Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 635 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See U.N. Secretary-General, Depositary Notification, Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of): Communication, U.N. Doc. C.N.829.2011.TREATIES-28 (Dec.
29, 2011).
130. Id.
131. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Bolivia to Re-accede to UN
Drug Convention, While Making Exception on Coca Leaf Chewing,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/January/bolivia-to-re-accede-
to-un-drug-convention-while-making-exception-on-coca-leaf-chew-
ing.html?ref=fs3 (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
132. Id.
133. See U.N. Secretary-General, Depositary Notification, United States of
America: Objection to the Reservation Contained in the Communication by the
Plurinational State of Bolivia, U.N. Doc. C.N.361.2012.TREATIES-VI.18 (July
10, 2012).
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new reservation on the grounds that it could lead to a larger sup-
ply of coca, “thereby fueling narcotics trafficking and related
criminal activity.”134 Although the United States seemed to ob-
ject on more substantive grounds, the INCB argued more philo-
sophically, hinting at what precedent this might set for other
signatories. The INCB argued that, while the maneuver might
“be in line with the letter of the Convention, such action is con-
trary to the Convention’s spirit.”135 In its statement, the INCB
thus recognized that Bolivia legally carried out its tactic, but it
disagreed entirely with the purposes for which Bolivia under-
took them. The INCB explained its concerns with the tactic as
follows:
The international community should not accept any approach
whereby Governments use the mechanism of denunciation and
re-accession with reservation, in order to free themselves from
the obligation to implement such certain treaty provisions.
Such approach would undermine the integrity of the global
drug control system, undoing the good work of Governments
over many years to achieve the aims and objectives of the drug
control conventions, including the prevention of drug abuse
which is devastating the lives of millions.136
Regardless of its displeasure with Bolivia’s actions, the INCB
remained powerless to discipline the country, besides suggesting
to parties of the Convention that they refrain from importing or
exporting drugs from Bolivia.137 The INCB’s inability to punish
Bolivia, whose actions, at least in the eyes of the INCB, clearly
circumvented the “Convention’s spirit,”138 highlights two issues
with the Convention. First, the INCB remains powerless to pre-
vent and substantively reprimand tactics that, while legal, go
against the purposes of the Convention. More importantly, the
134. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T, 2014
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 108 (Mar. 2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222849.htm.
135. International Narcotics Control Board Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 125.
136. Id.
137. See generally AMIRA ARMENTA & MARTIN JELSMA, TRANSNAT’L DRUG
INST., THEUNDRUGCONTROLCONVENTIONS: A PRIMER, TRANSNAT’LDRUG INST.
(Oct. 2015), https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/primer_unconven-
tions_24102015.pdf (stating that, in the event of apparent violations of the
Convention, such a recommendation is simply “as a last resort”).
138. International Narcotics Control Board Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 125.
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INCB’s inability to punish these wrongdoers sets a precedent for
other countries to follow Bolivia’s example, knowing that there
will likely be limited repercussions, if any at all.
B. The United States and its Doctrine of Flexibility
Think tank policy groups, like the Transnational Institute, ar-
gue that provisions in treaties like the Convention are now “out-
dated, no longer ‘fit for purpose’ to deal with new challenges and
do not reflect the reality of today’s multicultural and multiethnic
world.”139 In particular, “legal tensions between national policy
practices and the treaty framework are on the rise, especially in
the area of cannabis regulation.”140 This is certainly true with
respect to the United States’ state-level change in position with
respect to cannabis and the implications this change creates
with respect to honoring international agreements.141 There are
several implications stemming from the interactions between
federal and state-level law with respect to cannabis, including
those regarding international treaty obligations, such as the
Convention. In terms of its relationship to international treaties,
like the Convention, the U.S. doctrine of “flexibility” leads many
to question what implications such a doctrine might have on the
international stage.
1. Federal, State, and International Treaty Obligations
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), marijuana is a
Schedule I drug prohibited by federal law, unless otherwise spec-
ified.142 In support of its designation of marijuana as a Schedule
I drug, U.S. Congress and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), who is in charge of enforcing the CSA, stated that mari-
juana “has a high potential for abuse, . . . has no currently ac-
cepted medical use in treatment in the United States, . . . [and]
lack[s] . . . accepted safety [protocols] for use of the drug or other
substance under medical supervision.”143 Notwithstanding this
139. ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 16.
140. Id. at 16–17.
141. See generally Allison E. Don, Lighten Up: Amending the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 213 (2014) (discussing domestic
legislation in Colorado and Washington legalizing the recreational use of ma-
rijuana in light of international narcotic prohibitions).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2017).
143. § 812(b)(1); see also John Hudak, The Conflict Between Federal and State
Marijuana Laws Claims a Victim, NEWSWEEK (June 20, 2015, 4:47 PM),
2016] Should I Stay or Should I Go? 545
designation, petitions have been made by the average U.S. citi-
zen as well as governors of individual states to reschedule mari-
juana out of its status as a Schedule I narcotic.
Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the DEA re-
jected a petition to reschedule marijuana out of Schedule I of the
CSA, maintaining marijuana’s status as a federally prohibited
substance. Interestingly, in the memorandum denying this peti-
tion, the DOJ and the DEA highlight treaty considerations, and
specifically the Convention,144 to support their position. By call-
ing attention to the fact that the United States is a party to the
Convention, the memorandum noted the importance of ensuring
that the CSA acts in accordance with U.S. obligations under the
treaty. Thus, the DOJ and DEA argued that they were re-
strained from rescheduling marijuana in the CSA because,
“where a drug is subject to control under the Single Convention,
the DEA Administrator (by delegation from the Attorney Gen-
eral) must issue an order controlling such drug under the Sched-
ule he deems most appropriate to carry out such [treaty] obliga-
tions.”145 It was determined that in order to try to meet interna-
tional obligations under the Convention, marijuana must re-
main a Schedule I substance under the CSA.
As of the publication of this Note, recreational use of mariju-
ana is legal in Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Colum-
bia.146 One in five individuals in the United States now live in a
state that permits recreational use of marijuana without a me-
dicinal predicate.147 Although the push for marijuana legaliza-
tion does not necessarily have one clear root, certain rights
groups, like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have
provided reasons for why they seek marijuana reform.148 Groups
like the ACLU see the “war on marijuana” as being a “colossal
http://www.newsweek.com/conflict-between-federal-and-state-marijuana-
laws-claims-victim-345099.
144. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81
Fed. Reg. 53,767 (proposed Aug. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.).
145. Id.
146. See Melia Robinson, It’s 2017: Here’s Where You Can Legally Smoke
Weed Now, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/where-can-you-legally-smoke-weed-2017-1.
147. Id.
148. See Marijuana Law Reform, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/is-
sues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law-reform/marijuana-law-reform (last visited
Mar. 19, 2017).
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waste of resources, with states spending billions of dollars and
devoting thousands of hours of police work to it.”149 The ACLU
also argues that the enforcement of marijuana laws tends to per-
petuate some of the “starkest racial disparities”150 across the
United States. Others have argued that legalizing marijuana
might have some form of value socially, economically, and even
internationally by perhaps helping take profits away from car-
tels.151 Based on this changing legal landscape, the use of mari-
juana in recreational form is clearly a hot-button issue amongst
legislatures and legislators across the United States, but even
more so amongst voters.152 Similar to the significance with which
Bolivians have emphasized their right to utilize the coca leaf,
U.S. voters are now beginning to view these referendums as the
“triumph of average citizens over a draconian legal system that
imprisons large numbers of nonviolent drug users unneces-
sarily”153 and over a failed “War on Drugs.”154 Nevertheless,
states that have permitted marijuana for recreational use re-
main in “defiance” of federal law.155 Most significantly, because
the Convention is not a self-executing treaty, eachMember State
is obligated156 to implement laws enforcing the treaty itself
within its own jurisdictions.157 And while treaties like the Con-
vention are “concerned primarily with federal law,” this does
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Desirae Hoover, 4 Reasons Why Legalizing Marijuana Could Be the
Solution to America’s Problems, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2016, 1:46 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/desirae-hoover/4-reasons-why-legalizing-
_b_11870030.html.
152. See Marijuana on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Mari-
juana_on_the_ballot#2016 (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (noting federal, state, and
local legislative initiatives and the particular momentum with which ballot
measures are being voted upon with respect to marijuana legislation).
153. See Scott C. Martin, A Brief History of Marijuana Law in America, TIME
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/marijuana-history-in-america/.
154. Id.
155. SeeDonna Leinwand Leger,Marijuana to Remain Illegal Under Federal
Law, DEA Says, USA TODAY (Aug. 11, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/2016/08/11/dea-marijuana-remains-illegal-under-federal-
law/88550804/.
156. SeeN.Y.C. BAR: COMM. ONDRUGS& THELAW, supra note 30, at 2 (stating
that, pursuant to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a “coun-
try may not circumscribe its obligation” under the treaty “by enacting a con-
flicting domestic law”).
157. See generally id.
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“not exempt state and local governments from requirements of
international law.”158
Policing bodies of international conventions, such as the INCB
and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,159 have scrutinized the
legalization of recreational marijuana.160 In its annual report in
2014, the INCB acknowledged that, while cannabis remains a
controlled narcotic under federal law, the “legalization of the
production, sale and distribution of cannabis for non-medical
and non-scientific purposes” in individual states does not “meet
the requirements of the international drug control treaties,”161
including the Convention, as recreational use of marijuana does
not satisfy a medical, or any otherwise permissible, purpose. The
INCB warned that the provision that requires Member States to
limit the use of narcotics to medical and scientific purposes is
“strictly binding and not subject to flexible interpretation.”162
2. Doctrine of Flexibility
In the face of direct opposition to the legalization of recrea-
tional marijuana use, the U.S. government seems to maintain
the view that “flexible interpretation”163 permits the country to
interpret the treaty in a way that philosophically circumvents
158. Id. at 3.
159. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is tasked with assisting
Member States of these conventions by means of “field-based technical cooper-
ation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit
drugs, crime, and terrorism.” See About UNODC, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/in-
dex.html?ref=menutop (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). The UNODC also provides
“normative work to assist States in the ratification and implementation of the
relevant international treaties, the development of domestic legislation on
drugs, crime and terrorism. . . .” Id.
160. See Christopher Ingraham, The U.N. Really Wishes that Voters in
Alaska and Oregon Hadn’t Legalized Weed, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 14,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/14/the-u-n-re-
ally-wishes-that-voters-in-alaska-and-oregon-hadnt-legalized-weed/ (showing
remarks of current and former Executive Director of the UNODC, Yury Fedo-
tov, regarding state-level legalization of marijuana in the United States and
its incompatibility with existing conventions).
161. INT’LNARCOTICS CONTROLBOARD, supra note 23, at 11.
162. Id.
163. Damon Barrett, Martin Jelsma, & David Bewley-Taylor, Fatal Attrac-
tion: Brownfield’s Flexibility Doctrine and Global Drug Policy Reform,
HUFFINGTON POST: U.K. POL. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.co.uk/damon-barett/drug-policy-reform_b_6158144.html.
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the letter of the Convention. In support of the flexible interpre-
tation position, William R. Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Drugs and Law Enforcement,164 reiterated what the
United States refers to as its “four pillars”165 policy, which artic-
ulates the U.S. view on how the international community should
proceed regarding drug policy.166 The first pillar Brownfield set
forth was to assure the international community that the United
States would “respect the integrity of the existing UN Drug Con-
trol Conventions” by conveying its interest in remaining a Mem-
ber State to such treaties.167 Second, Brownfield stressed the im-
portance of the international community “accept[ing] flexible in-
terpretation of those conventions,” an interpretation that, pre-
sumably, would allow greater latitude for exceptions to the
changing legal climate regarding marijuana policy.168 Third,
Brownfield stated that Member States and the international
community should “tolerate different national drug policies, to
accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug ap-
proaches; [whereas] other countries will legalize entire catego-
ries of drugs.”169 This would require all countries to “work to-
gether in the international community”170 and to maintain “some
tolerance for those differing policies.”171 Lastly, Brownfield
urged in the fourth pillar that,
whatever our [international community] approach and policy
may be on legalization, decriminalization, de-penalization, we
[the international community] all agree to combat and resist
the criminal organizations – not those who buy, consume, but
those who market and traffic the product for economic gain.
164. This is now known as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs—a bureau within the U.S. State Department tasked with
fighting international crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad with the in-
tent of reducing the amount of crime and drugs that reach the shores of the
United States. See Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL), U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/inl/ (last visited Mar.
24, 2017).
165. Barrett, Jelsma, & Bewley-Taylor, supra note 163.
166. William R. Brownfield, Assistant Sec’y of State, Press Briefing: Trends
in Global Drug Policy (Oct. 9, 2014), https://2009-2017-
fpc.state.gov/232813.htm.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Respect the conventions; flexible interpretation; tolerance for
national polices; criminal organizations – that is our [U.S.]
mantra.172
As the representative of the U.S. government, Brownfield ra-
tionalized the four pillars by stating that “things have changed
since 1961,”173 and, thus, the United States must be given
enough flexibility to allow it to incorporate changes into poli-
cies.174 Brownfield and the United States fail to see, however,
that the country, as a member to treaties like the Convention,
has international obligations irrespective of independent inter-
pretations of how the international community should proceed
with respect to drug policy. The fact remains that the United
States’ flexible interpretation still tends to violate the provisions
against the recreational use of marijuana and spirit of the Con-
vention itself.
C. The Bolivian and U.S. Dance: What the Maneuvers Mean for
the Convention
Maneuvers such as Bolivia’s withdrawal and reaccession and
the U.S. pillars justification draw attention to the archaic nature
and rigidity of the Convention. For example, Bolivia operated
within the parameters set out by the Convention by withdraw-
ing and subsequently reacceding with reservations but was
thereafter criticized for what was, essentially, a circumvention
of the Convention’s purpose. Further, the United States argua-
bly is violating the Convention by using Brownfield’s “four pil-
lars” to rationalize state allowance of marijuana usage for recre-
ational purposes. Both approaches seem to exemplify that the
Convention chastises those who act legally under the Conven-
tion if the actions seem to go against the spirit of the Convention
and is restrictive in a changing landscape. As both President Mo-
rales of Bolivia andWilliam Brownfield of the U.S. State Depart-
ment note,175 treaties such as the Convention set forth a “‘one
size fits all’ arrangement with a rigid prohibitionist approach to
drugs that every country in the world is expected to adopt.”176 As
a result, when countries like Bolivia seek to exempt narcotics
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See generally id.; Bolivian Amendment Proposal, supra note 63.
176. ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 16.
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that are subject to the Convention’s prohibitions based on legit-
imate secondary uses, like cultural traditions, they are criticized
by both the Convention itself as well as policing bodies, such as
the INCB. Similarly, when countries such as the United States
seem to dictate their own “flexible” interpretation of treaties due
to shifts in domestic policy, they are nonetheless acting in con-
travention of the treaty because strict compliance is required. In
refusing to address the fact that independent states within its
territory are legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, the
United States has not adhered to the strict protocol demanded
by the terms of the Convention. And although the independent
state policy is not that of the federal government, the United
States is responsible for compliance by states within the country
itself.
In decertifying Bolivia, and thereby permitting the United
States to withhold its aid packages to Bolivia, the United States
cited Bolivia’s withdrawal from the Convention and subsequent
reaccession with a reservation, complaining that Bolivia “contin-
ues to promote the worldwide cultivation and commercialization
of coca leaf products, contrary to the conventions’ foundational
premises and Bolivia’s own reservation [to the Convention].”177
In Latin American nations, this U.S. process of decertification
has long led to the contributing notion that the U.S. government
is arrogant and hypocritical when it comes to drug policy.178 The
United States also fails to note that its four pillars have justified
state legalization of marijuana for recreational use, which vio-
lates the Convention’s prohibition of the use of recreational ma-
rijuana. Though other Member States do not support the proce-
dural methods employed by Bolivia in withdrawing and reacced-
ing with reservations, Bolivia at least attempted to follow the
rules set forth by the Convention as well as the INCB. For ex-
ample, John Walsh, coordinator of the Washington Office on
Latin America’s drug policy program,179 explicitly noted that, in
177. Oakford, supra note 18.
178. U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast From the Past, WASH. OFFICE ON
LATINAM. (Sept. 17, 2009), https://www.wola.org/2009/09/us-decertification-of-
bolivia-a-blast-from-the-past/.
179. The Washington Office on Latin America is a leading research and ad-
vocacy organization that also has special programs surrounding the legaliza-
tion and regulation of both cannabis and the coca plant. See About Us, WASH.
OFFICE ON LATIN AM., https://www.wola.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2017).
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“terms of its adherence to the convention system, Bolivia is in
fact more in line with international narcotics law”180 than the
United States, primarily because its method of withdrawal and
reaccession with reservations was “explicitly approved by UN
member states.”181 The United States approach, however is dif-
ferent because it is, in essence, ignoring procedure and the pa-
rameters of the Convention with its doctrine of flexibility.
The use of flexible interpretations by the United States is not
readily acceptable to the international community. As a result,
it is “hypocritical and arrogant that the U.S., with legal recrea-
tional marijuana in several states in violation of the UN Single
Convention, justifies Bolivia’s decertification by citing the coun-
try’s noncompliance with the same international accord.”182
There are clear problems posited by both Bolivia’s approach of
withdrawal and reaccession with declarations and the U.S.
method of simply ignoring international law and replacing com-
pliance with its own flexible interpretation of the treaty itself.
As the “idea of having a Single Convention”183was an “initiative”
of the United States, it should, in particular, do its best to com-
ply with the terms of the Convention.184 More significantly, as
the Convention appears unable to best address changing drug
policies for nations, on both the domestic and international
stage, the international narcotics treaty regime remains in a
constant state of stasis.
III. WHY CURRENT CONVENTION PROCEDURES DO NOT PERMIT
MEANINGFUL CHANGE
The Convention needs to be adjusted to either allow Member
States to modify their stances with respect to particular narcot-
ics or to counteract measures taken by states who intentionally
ignore the Convention’s provisions. There are a variety of ways
to modify the Convention. These solutions include reforming the
Convention itself and modifying the responsibilities relating to
Member States and governing bodies, such as the INCB.185 It is
important to note, however, that many of these possibilities set
the stage for “significant procedural complications and political
180. Oakford, supra note 18.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 3.
184. See generally id.
185. See id.
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obstacles,”186 as demonstrated by the rejected Bolivian amend-
ment and subsequent U.S. political criticisms after its reacces-
sion to the Convention. These obstacles work to prohibit mean-
ingful reform that may allow the treaty to evolve over time. Most
significantly, the difficulty of making such modifications often
prevents reform from occurring as a whole. As a result, rather
than playing legal hopscotch to try and comply with the Conven-
tion,187 some Member States188 have proceeded by simply ignor-
ing the treaty altogether. Thus, because wholesale reform seems
improbable, and because ignoring treaty provisions undermines
the purposes of the treaty, new proposals are needed to effectu-
ate change. This Part will discuss why proposed amendments to
and withdrawal from the Convention are ineffective methods to
achieve necessary change—namely, the promotion of equal
treatment with respect to signatory status of compliance. Fur-
thermore, this Part will discuss why withdrawal and subsequent
reaccession with reservations highlights the circumventive threats
that Member States pose to the Convention regime. In addition,
this Part will analyze why the doctrine of “flexibility” poses a
threat to treaty compliance generally, as exemplified by the U.S.
stance with respect to marijuana and permissive recreational
use at the state level. Lastly, this Part will discuss how the
INCB’s role has transitioned from a compliance watchdog to a
body that instead critiques proposed policy and why that role
does not comply with the Convention’s vision of how it should
operate.
A. Problems with Proposed Amendments and the Scorn of With-
drawal
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Convention, any Member State is
permitted to propose an amendment.189 Thus far, the procedure
186. Id. at 20.
187. See id. at 20 (stating that, because of reform difficulty, U.S. states and
Uruguay have “moved forward with cannabis regulation before finding a legal
solution to the problem of infringing the treaty system”).
188. See Laura Graham, Legalizing Marijuana in the Shadows of Interna-
tional Law: The Uruguay, Colorado, andWashingtonModels, 33 WIS. INT’LL.J.
140, 165 (2015) (arguing that the ability of “the United States to openly violate
provisions of the conventions with relative impunity invites future treaty vio-
lations”). Further, the article notes that without “flexibility or revision of the
scheduling,” the Convention might continue to “lose authority over the actions
of member states.” Id. at 165.
189. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 47.
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governing the amendment process has only been invoked twice
in the case of international drug control conventions.190 As ex-
hibited by Bolivia’s proposed amendment to the Convention, in-
voking the amendment process is incredibly difficult and will
likely fall short and come under heavy scrutiny, as seen through
the condemnation of the Bolivian amendment by other signato-
ries, like the United States. The United States led the opposition
to the Bolivian amendment to the Convention and based its de-
cision on the grounds that it wished to “maintain the integrity of
the Convention, which constitutes an important tool for the
global fight against drug trafficking.”191
Unlike Bolivia, the United States did not propose an amend-
ment to the Convention with respect to marijuana. Rather, the
United States adopted a flexible approach to interpreting the
Convention. This approach, however, is a hypocritical circum-
vention of the treaty, the integrity of which the United States
has sought to maintain by rejecting procedurally invoked
amendment procedures by other signatories, like Bolivia. Mov-
ing forward, the United States has two options: withdraw from
the Convention entirely or propose an amendment that accounts
for its change in domestic policies with respect to marijuana.192
Withdrawing entirely from the Convention could possibly bring
adverse consequences including, but not limited to, isolation,
sanctions, and a damaged reputation.193 Additionally, although
the Bolivian method of withdrawal and reaccession is another
path the United States could take, it is unlikely to do so, given
the reaction of the INCB and others in the international commu-
nity to Bolivia’s tactic.
190. See ARMENTA&JELSMA, supra note 137, at 20 (showing that amendment
procedures were invoked first in 1972, and later in 2009, when Bolivia pro-
posed its amendment exempting the country from abolishing coca chewing un-
der Article 49 of the Convention).
191. Martin Jelsma, D-Day for Bolivia’s Coca Chewing Amendment,
TRANSNAT’L INST. (Feb. 3, 2011), https://www.tni.org/en/article/d-day-bolivias-
coca-chewing-amendment.
192. See Molly Quinn, Implications of U.S. Noncompliance with the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, MICH. J. INT’L L. (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.mjilonline.org/implications-of-u-s-noncompliance-with-the-single-
convention-on-narcotic-drugs-of-1961/.
193. See id. (arguing that if the United States, as a “global hegemon,” were
to outright withdraw from the Convention, it would likely face adverse conse-
quences, such as “international isolation, trade sanctions, removal of financial
assistance and a damaged reputation”).
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Bolivia’s inability to successfully amend the Convention, cou-
pled with the United States’ seeming refusal to propose an
amendment or withdraw from the Convention, leads to two main
observations. First, countries are unlikely to propose an amend-
ment that they know will likely be unsuccessful. This will lead
countries to either withdraw from the treaty or act in contraven-
tion of its provisions. Second, there is no mechanism in place to
punish Member States who violate the treaty’s provisions. These
observations lead to the notion that this Convention is not
equipped to allow signatories to change stance with respect to
narcotics policies. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the inabil-
ity of its policing body to defend the Convention from signatories
who blatantly disregard its compliance provisions.
B. Temporary Withdrawal and Subsequent Reaccession with
Reservations—the Bolivian Method
When amendment proposals fail, parties might be inclined to
revert to the method employed by Bolivia: withdrawal and reac-
cession with reservations. When parties withdraw and subse-
quently reaccede with reservations, it seems that such a tactic
may be “nothing more than a crass attempt to evade legal obli-
gations just at the point when they begin to impose real con-
straints.”194 This poses alarming circumventive threats to the
foundation upon which international treaties are built because,
if Member States are permitted to join but are not reprimanded
when they violate the treaty, other Member States will begin to
question adhering to the treaty’s provisions.
Bolivia’s actions have opened the door for other countries to
potentially withdraw and reaccede with reservations, which may
very well threaten international multiparty agreements, such as
the Convention. If other Member States wish to take such an
approach, the procedure of withdrawal and reaccession with res-
ervations will likely “undermine the value of treaty bargains in
general and would specifically prejudice non-reserving states
that had relied on the terms of their treaty partners’ initial rat-
ification decisions.”195 The Bolivian method thus frustrates
Member States, who initially agreed to the treaty with the ex-
pectation that terms would remain unchanged or, at the very
194. Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and
Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 372–73 (2006).
195. Id. at 373.
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least, would not be drastically distorted by subsequent proce-
dural maneuvers. Specifically, the Bolivian method “sanctions
the unilateral and selective rejection of only those treaty com-
mitments that the denouncing state disfavors, while leaving the
remaining treaty provisions intact,”196 evoking an international
fear that Member States can pick and choose what provisions of
the treaty they wish to follow. This scheme of withdrawing and
reacceding with “late reservations” circumvents the antiquated
views that the treaty and INCB hold—that the treaty will re-
main unchanged, even when domestic agendas of respective
Member States are altered. Though it may benefit independent
Member States to have an ability to maneuver around particular
aspects of treaties that threaten their domestic policies, this ma-
neuver ultimately undermines the Convention itself, its policing
bodies, as well as treaties generally within the international
framework.
C. Tabula Rasa or Ignorance—a New Treaty or Denunciation in
Light of U.S. Noncompliance
Commentators have argued that another viable option is the
creation of an entirely new treaty that specifically governs nar-
cotics that have been subject to modern liberalization.197 This
would seem to include individual treaties aimed at addressing
specific narcotics. The creation and implementation of an en-
tirely new treaty to address specific narcotics, however is not
only myopic but also threatens the goals of the Convention, as
multilateral treaties are designed to promote and perpetuate in-
ternational participation in the governing of narcotics.
Member States who raise issues with one or more of the treaty
provisions have also toyed with the idea of pure denunciation
and withdrawal. Some have noted that in “light of the jurassic
nature of the drug control treaties and the seemingly insur-
mountable procedural and political obstacles to change them,
the question is often raised why countries should not simply ig-
nore or withdraw from the UN drug control treaty regime.”198
Simply ignoring the terms of a treaty, however, does not lead to
196. Id.
197. See generally Elana Rodman, From Criminalization to Regulation: New
Classifications of Cannabis Necessitate Reform of United National Drug Trea-
ties, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 647 (2014).
198. ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 22.
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long-term treaty compliance or the creation of international
“common objectives,”199 as doing so without consequence would
antagonize fully compliant Member States into questioning
their own loyalty to the Convention or perhaps ignoring it as
well. The United States runs the risk of encouraging noncompli-
ance by other signatories in light of its transitioning domestic
marijuana policy and subsequent ignorance of international nar-
cotics treaties, such as the Convention.
As recreational use of marijuana is legal in a handful of U.S.
states (with the prospect of more on the horizon), the INCB has
repeatedly urged the United States to “resolve the contradiction
between the federal and state levels in the implementation” of
its obligations under the Convention.200 Currently, U.S. federal
law still prohibits the recreational use of marijuana, however,
state law differs in multiple states across the country. Merely
ignoring the requests made by the policing body of the interna-
tional drug control conventions does not reflect well upon the
Member State or the policing body itself. Specifically, if other
countries observe the hypocrisy with which the United States
has seemed to conduct itself with, other powerful Member States
similarly will ignore the provisions with which they disagree,
leading to the overall notion that this treaty is one that can be
molded to shape their own policy preferences.
D. How the INCB Perpetuates Obstacles
As the INCB operates as an independent monitor of Member
State obligations under international drug control conven-
tions,201 it plays a significant role in the international drug con-
trol system, expanding far beyond the Convention itself.202 Nev-
ertheless, while the INCB is “tasked with monitoring national
199. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, pmbl.
200. UN Accuses USA of Violating Drug Treaties, EUR. COALITION JUST &
EFFECTIVE DRUG POLICIES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.encod.org/info/UN-
ACCUSES-USA-OF-VIOLATING-DRUG.html.
201. See DAMON BARRETT, INT’L HARM REDUCTION ASS’N, UNIQUE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A COMPARISON OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL BOARD AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES (2008),
http://www.ihra.net/files/2010/06/16/Barrett-UniqueinInternationalRela-
tions.pdf.
202. Id.
2016] Should I Stay or Should I Go? 557
drug policies and assessing their relationship with the trea-
ties,”203 it is particularly important to recognize that the INCB
has “no police power to enforce the Conventions’ provisions.”204
It is general understanding, however, that the INCB “often re-
lies on informal pressure in its attempts to encourage what it
perceives to be treaty compliance.”205 Such pressure is limited to
the INCB’s ability to exert procedural pressures.206 In what com-
mentators have described as “name and shame”207 procedures,
the INCB has the power to inform the U.N. General Assembly of
any impropriety when it finds that a Member State did not pro-
vide a legitimate explanation for its apparent violation of the
Convention (subsequent to the initial violation inquiry) and said
party failed to pursue proper remedial measures.208 Addition-
ally, when such procedures are not enough, the INCB can also
recommend to Member States that they cease the “import of
drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or ter-
ritory concerned.”209 This power is what commentators have re-
ferred to as the “nuclear option,”210 and is considered to be a “per-
suasive mechanism”211 for ensuring treaty compliance.212 It is
therefore the responsibility of the INCB not only to “monitor
treaty compliance”213 but also “report perceived infractions to in-
fluential bodies within the U.N. and consequently exert signifi-
cant pressure upon nation states.”214 These powers, however, are
seemingly not strong enough to guarantee Convention compli-
ance. Even in making its reports to the United Nations, whether
it be condemning Bolivia’s tactics or critiquing U.S. circumven-
tion, the INCB does not seem to deter wrongdoers and ensure
strict compliance of the Convention’s provisions.
Analysts also note that the INCB tends to surpass its mandate
with respect to reforming the treaty itself.215 As exemplified by
203. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 3–4.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Id.
209. See id.; see also Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 14.
210. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 4.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 15.
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the Bolivian and U.S. examples, some have argued that it is the
responsibility of the INCB to provide detailed and hands-on
technical assistance in ensuring means of treaty compliance ra-
ther than simply acknowledging that the treaty is being vio-
lated.216 That said, one of the largest criticisms of the INCB is
that it is moving away from its mandate as the “watchdog” of the
conventions by “describing the global situation, and bringing at-
tention to challenges and dilemmas” and toward a “guardian”
role by challenging any policy that does not correspond with the
original version of the control system.217 In other words, it re-
mains the strongest critic of any signatory that has a change in
policy when it comes to how that signatory views a particular
narcotic and the purposes it might serve. Thus, to some, the
INCB appears to be neglecting its role in “reconcile[ing] differ-
ences between the member states’ positions and looking at the
options that emerge as the debate progresses.”218 The INCB ap-
pears to be reluctant in adapting to changing domestic policies
regarding the narcotics that the Convention governs and finding
potential solutions. This appears to trouble drug policy think
tanks and those signatories who seek reform. Rather than en-
courage policies that may alleviate particular tensions or sup-
port particular agendas in various nations, Member States re-
main locked in to how the INCB frames their modes of compli-
ance or noncompliance. Notwithstanding the INCB’s views with
respect to its role, however, they still fail to have the necessary
tools to ensure general compliance with those treaty provisions.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are several possible solutions that the international
community might wish to explore. These range from altering the
substance of the Convention itself (by way of an amendment), to
providing the governing bodies of the Convention with sufficient
tools to dissuadeMember States from violating or circumventing
Convention norms. Lastly, the governing bodies themselves,
particularly the INCB, might wish to refocus the purposes for
which they were designed and instead encourage reform for
Member States and the Convention itself.
216. See id.
217. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 1.
218. ARMENTA& JELSMA, supra note 137, at 15.
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A. Pass an Amendment Preventing Withdrawal and Reacces-
sion
Precedent regarding amendments is generally unfavorable for
states seeking to amend the Convention.219 Thus far, there have
been two proposed amendments to the Convention: a blanket se-
ries of amendments altering the Convention in 1972, known as
the “1972 Protocol,” and second, the failed 2009 Bolivian pro-
posal. Instead, Member States should unify behind the idea of a
blanket amendment prohibiting withdrawal and reaccession
with reservations and ignorance of the treaty, as it could avoid
frustration sustained by many of the Member States. It could do
this with a similar level of support comparable to that demon-
strated for the 1972 Protocol.
The Bolivian example demonstrates what is the “often con-
tested and protracted nature of debate around the revision of a
variety of regimes,” but particularly with a Member State’s abil-
ity to withdraw from the treaty because of an unfavorable provi-
sion and reaccede with a stipulation that allows the Member
State to ignore that provision.220 This has led scholars to con-
clude that, “even where there is almost universal agreement on
the need for some sort of reform, there is seldom a unanimously
accepted vision of exactly what a recalibrated regime should look
like.”221 Thus, even though Member States and the INCB recog-
nize that change is needed to prevent parties, such as Bolivia,
from using maneuvers like withdrawal and reaccession with res-
ervations to reflect their domestic policies, it remains uncertain
as to what these changes would look like. Consequently, Member
States, coalitions formed therefrom, and the Convention itself
remain immobile, unable to address new challenges facing both
the Convention and the parties bound to it. Although these ex-
amples do not demonstrate that Convention reform is an impos-
sibility, they also do not demonstrate that consensus is likely.
Coalitions of Member States within the international commu-
nity, otherwise known as “like-minded groups,”222 have, in turn,
219. See generally Rodman, supra note 197.
220. DAVE BEWLEY-TAYLOR, TRANSNAT’L INST., SERIES ON LEGISLATIVE
REFORM OF DRUG POLICIES NR. 19: TOWARDS REVISION OF THE UN DRUG-
CONTROL CONVENTIONS: THE LOGIC AND DILEMMAS OF LIKE-MINDED GROUPS 6
(Mar. 2012), https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr19.pdf.
221. Id.
222. See id.
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become a blessing and a curse to international drug control trea-
ties, such as the Convention.223 The Bolivian amendment met
the opposition of seventeen like-minded signatories, thus
demonstrating that Member State coalitions can cut both ways.
They ensure that parties facially comply with the provisions of
the Convention, but they also have the ability to halt large-scale
reform within the narcotic treaty community. Although Bolivia’s
maneuvering may promote a form of circumvention, its actions
demonstrate a stasis and inability to lead to more meaningful
change within the Convention itself.
If a “group or bloc”224 of Member States then sought to prevent
others, like Bolivia, from employing a reaccession tactic, a
“safety in numbers approach [would] offer protective benefits,”225
thereby offering a path toward proposing a general amendment
to the treaty itself. For Member States and coalitions seeking to
eliminate this procedural circumvention of the Convention’s pro-
visions, a like-minded group is the best approach for the estab-
lishment of a blanket amendment that would prohibit this ma-
neuver of withdrawing and reacceding with reservations. If
Member States were to unify behind their disapproval of Bo-
livia’s tactic and what the United States is currently doing, for
example, a blanket amendment prohibiting both approaches
would lead to a sense of concord and legitimacy that interna-
tional treaties, such as the Convention, require.
B. Greater Enforcement Power
Another possible maneuver that the United Nations andMem-
ber States may wish to consider is to empower the INCB or rel-
evant governing bodies with the proper tools to enforce compli-
ance. In the context of the Convention, these tools should go be-
yond the INCB’s current power to bring a matter to the attention
the U.N. General Assembly. Although the INCB’s current pow-
ers may be enough to deter some, it is simply not enough to deter
all from making unilateral decisions that have a greater impact
on the way the global community views the Convention. As the
United States example shows, the Convention fails to prevent
223. See generally id.
224. Id. at 5.
225. Id.
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Member States from using self-defined “flexible” interpreta-
tions226 to circumvent unconditional compliance of the Conven-
tion.
As none of the recommendations made by the INCB are legally
binding on the Member States,227 narcotics treaties, like the
Convention, lack an “international police force standing at the
ready to force countries to fulfill their obligations.”228 As a result,
the INCB must resort to “quiet diplomacy” or “blaming and
shaming” as means to sway compliance.229 Aside from embargo
recommendations under Article 14, the INCB lacks any enforce-
ment powers, and, instead, the committee relies upon the “good
faith of states”230 to comply with the decisions and recommenda-
tions it sets forth.231
If the INCB were empowered with the ability to reprimand, by
way of some type of sanction, Member States that violate (or ig-
nore) the terms and provisions of the Convention, a stronger de-
terrent would exist to persuade states to follow the rules. Fur-
thermore, if the INCB did have enforcement power, the INCB
would be able to encourage mutual respect for both the INCB
and the Convention as an international accord.
The Convention, however, generally places restrictions upon
the authority of the INCB to “further the co-operation of Govern-
ments” and to “facilitate effective national action to attain the
aims” of the Convention.232 Thus, according to the Convention,
the INCB must “always operate in the ‘spirit of dialogue’” rather
than adjudicate the guilt of Member States.233 If the INCB were
to simply pronounce that they now possess the power to penalize
Member States (either monetarily or in other form), this would
likely breed resentment beyond that which some contend al-
ready exists between the INCB and the Member States it pre-
sides over. As a result, the form of that enforcement power
should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the
226. Brownfield, supra note 166.
227. BARRETT, supra note 201, at 17.
228. N.Y.C. BAR: COMM. ONDRUGS& THE LAW, supra note 30, at 3.
229. Id.
230. BARRETT, supra note 201, at 27.
231. Id.
232. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 12, art. 9.
233. SeeMartin Jelsma, Treaty Guardians in Distress: The Inquisitorial Na-
ture of the INCB Response to Bolivia, TRANSNAT’L INST. (July 12, 2011),
http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/weblog/item/2626-treaty-guardians-in-dis-
tress.
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Convention itself. In other words, the enforcement power that
strengthens the INCB’s ability to monitor compliance should
also stem from the support of Member States themselves.
C. Alter the Purpose of the INCB
Another possible path that the international narcotics commu-
nity might take, specifically those signatories to the Convention
itself, is to revise the scope and role of the INCB. As the INCB is
the “body charged with monitoring the implementation of the
conventions,”234 some commentators have argued that the INCB
has forgotten its purpose and that the true INCB has been ra-
ther voracious in plunging itself into the waters of international
policymaking. This is far different from what the INCB was de-
signed to do as a policing body of the Convention.
The INCB limits itself to several methods of operation with
respect to discharging its responsibilities. These methods in-
clude helping Member States formulate systems of narcotic esti-
mates so that governments can better address supply and de-
mand issues, monitoring and promoting measures taken by gov-
ernments to prevent the diversion of these substances for illicit
purposes, analyzing information provided by these governments
in helping ensure their compliance to the Convention, and main-
taining a dialogue with signatories to assist their compliance
with the provisions therein.235 Now, however, many commenta-
tors seem to argue that the INCB no longer encourages a dia-
logue but instead offers lectures when signatories go astray of
the duties INCB owed to the Convention.
In other words, member noncompliance, coupled with the view
that the INCB has exceeded its mandate provided to it by the
Convention, merely reiterates the notion that the blame is not
to fall upon the back of one body. As the INCB vigorously voices
its dismay with party noncompliance, it “ignores the limitations
in the Conventions as regards interference with sovereignty and
autonomy of member states in constructing national drug pol-
icy.”236 Commentators have argued:
The Board [INCB] is misinterpreting the Conventions and
oversteps its mandate when it tries to influence or control the
234. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 1.
235. Mandate and Functions, supra note 46.
236. BEWLEY-TAYLOR&TRACE, supra note 47, at 9.
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internal policies of governments as regards the use of con-
trolled drugs, particularly when a government takes a different
view from the Board, or individual Board members, in matters
of public health policy, crime prevention, clinical practice or re-
duction of demand for illicit drugs. The Board frequently con-
demns the policies of sovereign states in these areas, even
when it is unqualified to comment.237
While not the cure-all adjustment that the international nar-
cotics community needs, a sincere revision of the INCB’s man-
date would be a significant first step toward positive adjust-
ments. Rather than publicly admonish Member States like the
United States for its ignorance or Bolivia for its circumvention
of the “spirit” of the Convention, the INCB should work more
closely with those Member States in synchronizing the goals of
the Convention with progressive and changing attitudes toward
particular narcotics.
In refocusing its mission, an adjustment to the treaty itself
might not be entirely necessary. For example, it is not entirely
clear that the INCB’s opinion with respect to policymaking is a
but-for cause of the disharmony within the international drug
community. Nevertheless, as the Convention requires Member
States to take actions on their own behalf, it is important that
they respect the INCB and its sole job in administering compli-
ance. Such respect would be improved by a self-imposed re-
minder that both the Member States and the INCB owe them-
selves to the Convention and not to each other.
CONCLUSION
While the Convention remains a milestone in the realm of in-
ternational narcotics agreements, the problems highlighted by
Bolivian and U.S. tactics, through withdrawal and reaccession
with reservations and outright refusal to follow the treaty, re-
spectively, raise concerns, both to signatories and the interna-
tional narcotics regime as a whole. Signatories can evade the
spirit of the Convention while also escaping punishment for a
blatant refusal in abiding by its provisions. Furthermore, its
governing body has transformed from one intended to encourage
discussion on the matters faced by signatories to one more prone
237. TRANSNATIONAL INST., DRUG POLICY BRIEFING NR. 4: THE ERRATIC
CRUSADE OF THE INCB (Feb. 2003), https://www.tni.org/files/down-
load/brief4.pdf.
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to criticism. The INCB remains powerless to ensure that all sig-
natories comply with both the provisions and spirit of the Con-
vention but also remains excessively eager to lecture Member
States who seek some type of change. Furthermore, Member
State drug policies that adhere to long-standing heritage and
culture, or perhaps are changing to reflect progressivism by way
of voter referendum, buttress these hostile critiques promul-
gated by the INCB, all of which lead to a continuous stream of
tension and confusion amongst the international narcotics com-
munity.
In light of Bolivian withdrawal and reaccession with reserva-
tions, the United States has been keen to criticize the country on
all fronts while maintaining the theory that the United States
itself can flexibly interpret the treaty to allow domestic legisla-
tion surrounding the recreational use of marijuana.238 The frus-
tration is not enveloped in the criticism, but instead in a system
that punishes countries who conform (as exhibited by the Boliv-
ian maneuver) and one that does not punish countries that pa-
tently ignore the provisions to which they are bound.
In sum, the Convention does not bind countries equally. Nor
do those policing bodies monitoring compliance with the Conven-
tion have the ability to ensure that necessary compliance is un-
conditional. Therefore, the international community needs to
answer this question: should the treaty be rewritten, or should
more be done in order to enforce and ensure compliance? Which-
ever manner the question is phrased, it must be done so with the
legitimacy of international agreements kept in mind. Neverthe-
less, if Bolivia and the United States feel as though they do not
have to comply, why should anybody else?
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